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Abstract: The EU regulatory framework for e-communications was adopted by the 
European Parliament and the Council in 2002, and became applicable from 2003. It has 
three primary objectives: (1) to promote competition; (2) to develop the single market; and 
(3) to promote citizens' rights. The European Commission's DG Information Society 
commissioned London Economics to estimate the level of e-communications investment 
in the EU and to examine its main drivers as part of a contribution to the Commission's 
2006 review of the e-communications framework. This paper outlines some of the findings 
of that study. The paper provides a description of the process of collecting data on 
investment in physical infrastructure in the e-communciations sector by country and by 
sub-sector. It also presents the collected data, showing a decline in overall investment 
between 2001 and 2003 and a subsequent upturn in 2004. An econometric analysis of the 
drivers of investment over the period is undertaken, which suggests that better performing 
regulatory regimes, as measured by an OECD regulatory index, can contribute to higher 
levels of investment in the sector. 
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he renewed Lisbon Agenda for Europe seeks to stimulate innovation, 
creativity and entrepreneurship in the ICT and media sectors. In this 
respect, e-communications play a key role as they have become 
increasingly instrumental to economic growth, innovation and creativity. The 
EU regulatory framework for e-communications was adopted by the 
European Parliament and the Council in 2002, and became applicable from 
2003. It has three primary objectives: (1) to promote competition; (2) to 
develop the single market; and (3) to promote citizens' rights. The European 
Commission's DG Information Society commissioned London Economics to 
estimate the level of e-communications investment in the EU and to examine 
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its main drivers as part of a contribution to the Commission's 2006 review of 
the e-communications framework. This paper outlines some of the findings 
of that study (London Economics and PwC, 2006).  
One of the key objectives for the study was the development of a dataset 
for investment in the e-communications sector across the EU that would 
enable the examination of investment both at the aggregate level and at the 
level of each member state and for a number of sub-sectors – fixed 
telecommunciations, mobile telecommunications, broadbcasting and cable. 
The focus was to be on investment in physical infrastructure, such as the 
communications networks and associated equipment. Investment data was 
collected for the period 2001-2004 and analysed to identify the patterns of 
investment over this period. In addition, an econometric analysis was 
undertaken to seek to determine the main drivers of investment and, in 
particular, the extent to which regulation may affect investment. 
Previous studies have found a positive relationship between investment 
in telecommuncations and GDP (RÖLLER & WAVERMAN, 2001; 
WALLSTEN 2003a, 2003b) and also between investment and privatisation 
and competition (LI & XU, 2002). In the latter study, although competition is 
identified as a key complement to privatisation, stimulating investment in 
telecommunications, the authors do not find the effect to be significant. 
Wallsten (WALLSTEN, 2003a) also found that ‘exclusivity' arrangements 
(whereby governments grant monopoly rights to the incumbent 
telecommunications provider in order to increase the firm's value to private 
investors) have a negative and significant effect on investment.  
  Collection of investment data 
The primary source of investment data was company annual reports. 
Investment data was collected from the annual reports of over 200 market 
players. The aim was to identify sufficient market players to represent 90% 
of the overall market for these services.  
Data for increases to tangible fixed assets were collected with the 
preferred source being cash flow statements or the notes accompanying 
those statements. In these sources, investment is usually specified as 
"additions to tangible fixed assets", or "additions to property plant and 
equipment". The main advantage of using data from cash flow statements is 
that they include only annual acquisitions of property, plant and equipment 
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and not changes in the value of the stock of tangible fixed assets that can 
occur for reasons other than new investment, such as revaluations and 
mergers and acquisitions. 
Only additions to tangible fixed assets are included in the investment 
figures, as a sale of fixed assets does not represent a decrease in 
investment in the e-communications sub-sector. Hence all figures reported 
relate to gross and not net investment. In a minority of cases, data from 
company annual reports were not available. In those cases, alternative 
sources of information were used. For some companies, figures from the 
Amadeus database on the stock of tangible fixed assets (as reported in the 
balance sheet) were used and investment computed as the annual change 
in tangible fixed assets. Data from a survey of operators undertaken by the 
study team were also used. Where companies operate in more than one 
sub-sector and/or across more than one country, published annual reports 
do not always provide such a breakdown. Where this was the case, the 
shares of total capital expenditure, including intangibles, for individual sub-
sectors were used as weights to disaggregate totals. Similarly, the share of 
the country's capital expenditure in total capital expenditure was used as the 
weight to disaggregate investment totals for relevant companies by country.  
The adjustments made to the disaggregated data, and subsequent tests 
on the data, suggest that they contain some measurement error and should 
be treated with caution. At a more aggregated level, data is likely to be more 
reliable as it comes straight from the annual reports. Other sources of 
aggregate investment data were investigated for the purposes of 
comparison. These included investment data published by the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU), the OECD and by Eurostat. 
Figure 1 shows fixed and mobile telephony investment in Germany, 
Spain, France, Italy and the United Kingdom. In 2004 these countries 
accounted for 64% of EU25 investment (based on LE estimates). The 
estimates of total investment in fixed and mobile telephony vary between the 
four sources. 
There are several factors that contribute to this difference. All three of the 
other sources include intangible assets (except spectrum licence fees), 
whilst the data collected from company reports excludes intangible assets. 
Interestingly, although the investment definitions used by the ITU and 
Eurostat appear to be very similar (except that the Eurostat data includes 
satellite investment and the ITU does not), the ITU provides higher estimates 
of investment. One further factor is that London Economics data has not 
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been collected from every company in the sector (though the data collected 
is expected to have captured a large part of physical infrastructure 
investment). 
Figure 1 - Comparison of investment data in fixed and mobile telephony  
from different sources (€m, 2001 prices) 
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
ITU Eurostat OECD LE Data  
Note: Fixed and mobile telephony investment for Germany, Spain, France, Italy and the United 
Kingdom. 
Sources: Eurostat, OECD Communications Outlook 2005, ITU World Telecommunications 
Indicators Database 2005, annual reports and LE calculations. 
  Patterns of investment  
The LE data in figure 1 shows a decline in investment over the period 
2001-2003 followed by an upturn in 2004. Discussions with market 
operators, undertaken as part of the study, suggested a general view that 
the decline from the peak in investment in 2001 was a part of the normal 
investment cycle, with the collapse of the financial bubble contributing to the 
decline. Following a period of high investment in the late 1990s, many 
operators were consolidating their positions and focussing on increasing 
revenues from their new infrastructure. Other factors that were cited as 
contributing to the decline to 2003 were limited availability of credit and 
investment opportunities; increased competition and regulatory uncertainty. 
New market opportunities, improving economic conditions and regulatory 
developments were viewed as factors that contributed to the upturn.  
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From an examination of the sub-sectoral breakdown of e-
communications investments in the European Union we observe that most 
investments were in fixed and mobile telephony (see figure 2) 1. This can be 
explained by the large investments needed to support the uptake of new 
technological developments in those sectors, such as fixed broadband 
services, new generation networks and 3G mobile telephony. The modest 
share of broadcast investments suggests that the ongoing digitization 
process in broadcasting is less investment-intensive than current changes in 
telephony and data transmission. 
Figure 2 - Composition of gross investment by sub-sector (2001-2004, 2001 prices) 
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Sources: Annual reports and LE calculations 
Many of the EU15 member states show very low investment figures in 
the fixed sub-sector, and to a lesser extent in the mobile sub-sector. This is 
particularly relevant for Portugal, France, Austria, Germany and Belgium 
(see figure 3). Although new member states have investment figures above 
the EU average for the mobile industry, many EU15 countries have also 
been investing heavily in this new technology; and in some instances more 
so than the new member states. 
                     
1 Fixed telephony also includes broadband services. 
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Figure 3 - Investment 2001-2004 by sub-sectors (% of GDP) 
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Sources: Annual reports and LE calculations 
  The model 
To estimate the determinants of investment we posit a general model 
based on country- and market-specific characteristics. Having data at the 
firm level, we depart from previous studies by also incorporating firm-specific 
characteristics.   
Our proposed model for gross investment is expressed as follows: 
ln(Iijt) = α + β Z1jt+ δ Z2jt + η Z3ijt + εijt , 
where ln(Iijt) is the logarithm of gross investment in tangible assets 2 for 
each firm i in country j and year t,  
Z1jt are country-specific characteristics that change over time. We include 
real GDP per capita, land area and population density, and expect that those 
countries with higher GDP per capita and larger areas have higher levels of 
                     
2 Deflated using the U.S. telecommunications deflator to constant 2001 prices. GDP per capita 
figures have been rebased to 2001 and deflated using the HICP (Harmonised Index of 
Consumer Prices) from Eurostat. 
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investment, whereas those countries with higher density will require lower 
levels of investment,  
Z2jt are market-specific characteristics that change over time. In the 
model we include an index of regulatory reform developed by the OECD 
(CONWAY & NICOLETTI, 2006). This measures regulatory performance in 
each country and changes over time 3, 
Z3ijt are firm-specific characteristics that may or may not change over 
time. We use a measure of firms' total assets, a dummy variable to identify 
incumbent operators (versus new entrants), and dummy variables to control 
for whether a firm operates in more than one sub-sector, or more than one 
country 4, 
α, β, δ and η are the model parameters to be estimated and ε is the error 
term. 
  Results 
The results of different model specifications are presented in table 1. 
Model [1] includes only the log of the OECD regulatory index 5 (lioecd), 
country-specific variables (the logs of GDP per capita, area, and density, 
denoted as lgdpc, lland and ldensity, respectively) and year fixed effects 
(d2002, d2003). In this simple form, the model already shows that the 
regulatory index is statistically significant and with a positive sign, indicating 
that those countries with a lower regulatory performance have less 
investment. 
                     
3 The OECD index measures regulatory performance in terms of the degree of free entry into 
the market; the extent of government ownership of the major operators; and market structure, 
based on market shares. Following an inversion of the index by London Economics, a higher 
index number indicates an improved regulatory performance. 
4 The importance of the cost of capital has been recognised elsewhere as a determinant of a 
firm’s investment (JORGENSON, 1983). However, a measure of cost of capital could not be 
constructed for a significant number of companies in the sample. Consequently, the cost of 
capital is not included in our regressions. In preliminary estimations for a reduced number of 
companies we found that this variable was not statistically significant. This may be due to its 
high correlation with some other variables included in the model. 
5 Measured in terms of the degree of free entry into the market; the extent of government 
ownership of the major operators; and market structure, based on market shares. 
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Table 1 - Regression results for determinants of investment (firm-level data) 
Explanatory variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
lgdpc 0.481 (1.71) 
0.33 
(1.35) 
0.722 
(1.93) 
lland 0.416   (2.79)** 
0.55 
  (4.57)** 
0.319 
(1.93) 
ldensity 0.545   (2.76)** 
0.808 
  (4.96)** 
0.192 
(0.99) 
lioecd 0.908   (3.20)** 
0.573 
  (2.65)** 
0.332 
(1.52) 
dmobile -- 1.202   (5.17)** 
1.237 
  (4.75)** 
dinc -- 2.062   (8.91)** 
0.919 
(2.18)* 
mnat -- 0.677  (2.05)* 
0.176 
(0.41) 
msec -- 0.332 (1.26) 
0.753 
(2.14)* 
d2002 -0.514 (-1.67) 
-0.431 
(-1.73) -- 
d2003 -0.781  (-2.41)* 
-0.656 
 (-2.53)* 
-0.234 
(-0.94) 
lla -- -- 0.275   (2.81)** 
Constant -0.071 (-0.03) 
-2.705 
(-1.69) 
-6.143 
  (-3.05)** 
Observations 292 292 155 
R-squared 0.09 0.44 0.55 
Note: Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
For model [2], dummy variables indicating whether the firm is an 
incumbent (dincum), operates in the mobile subsector (dmobile), operates in 
more than one sector (msec), or operates multinationally (mnat) have been 
added. The coefficients for lland and ldensity are statistically significant, 
meaning that those countries with larger area and higher density have higher 
levels of investment. GDP per capita, however, is not significant in this 
model. The coefficient for the regulatory index shows again a positive and 
significant sign. The coefficient indicating the firms' incumbent status is 
significant and positive illustrating a higher investment for those firms 
compared with new entrants. 
Model [3] also includes firms' total assets (to control for the fact that 
larger companies have higher levels of investment). The variable is included 
in logs and lagged one period (lla), so that current levels of investment are 
not correlated with the current size of the company but with its assets in the 
previous year.  
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The results of the model predict that countries' GDP per capita has an 
impact on the levels of investment. In particular a 1% increase in GDP per 
capita would lead to a 0.7% increase in the level of investment. The 
country's area has also a positive and significant impact, but not density (this 
is due to the correlation between density and the land area variable). 
The dummy variable for the mobile sub-sector, dmobile, is statistically 
significant and means that on average investment in the mobile sub-sector is 
higher than investment in the fixed telephony sub-sector (which is the 
omitted dummy). Finally, the dummies for firms' multinational and multisector 
dimensions show that those firms operating in more than one sector invest 
more than an equivalent firm that only works in one sub-sector, but not firms 
operating in more than one country. 
The regulatory index variable is still positive, but significant only at the 
13% level. The lower statistical significance is probably due to the 
collinearity of firms' assets with the regulatory index. However, it should be 
noted that model [2] and model [3] are not strictly comparable because they 
have different numbers of observations. Observations are excluded from 
model [3] due to missing values in the total assets variable. For these 
reasons, the precise estimate of the coefficient for regulatory index is difficult 
to obtain, but it is likely to lie in the range 0.57 to 0.33. What is important to 
note is that the performance of the regulatory regime does seem to be an 
important determinant of investment (as indicated by the consistent positive 
sign), but the magnitude of this effect may be low compared to some other 
factors such as GDP per capita. 
Overall, the model has good statistical properties, and an R2 of 0.55 in 
model [3]. Correlation coefficients are generally low and we use the Huber-
White sandwich estimator of variance (HUBER, 1967; WHITE, 1980) to 
correct for heteroskedasticity and to ensure that our standard errors are 
robust. 
As a robustness check we also estimate two additional models, which 
use similar model specifications, but aggregate investment data at the 
country level (for each year and sector). One of these models used the 
OECD index as the measure of regulatory effectiveness and the other used 
the ECTA scorecard (ECTA, 2004). Both models show that efficient 
regulation is a significant explanatory factor and leads to higher levels of 
investment. 
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  Conclusions 
Overall, we conclude from this analysis that there are a number of 
important factors that contribute to determining investment levels.  
A better performing regulatory regime does appear to be one of those 
factors. We used an OECD index as our main measure of regulatory 
effectiveness, though similar results were also obtained when the ECTA 
index was used. The OECD Index measures regulatory performance in 
terms of the degree of free entry into the market; the extent of government 
ownership of the major operators; and market structure, based on market 
shares. The market entry and market structure elements of the index mean 
that this measure is quite similar to a measure of the degree of competition 
or, perhaps, the extent to which the regulatory regime is allowing or 
encouraging competition to take place. 
Other factors that have an important positive influence on company 
investment levels are GDP per capita, the land area and population density 
of the country in which they operate; and the size of the company, as 
measured by total asset value of the company. Factors related to company 
size, such as status as an incumbent and investment across more than one 
sector, were also influential. Firms operating in more than one sub-sector 
invest more in a single sub-sector than an equivalent firm operating only in 
that sub-sector, but not firms operating in more than one country. 
S. JONES & P. SALSAS 39 
References 
CONWAY P. & G. NICOLETTI (2006): "Product Market Regulation in Non-
Manufacturing Sectors in OECD countries: Measurement and Highlights", OECD 
Economics Department Working Paper, forthcoming. 
ECTA, Jones Day, SPC Network (2004): European Regulatory Scorecard 2004. 
HUBER P.J. (1967): "The Behavior of Maximum Likelihood Estimates under 
Nonstandard Conditions", in Proceedings of the Fifth Berkeley Symposium on 
Mathematical Statistics and Probability. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
vol. 1, 221–223.  
JORGENSON D.W., (2003): "Information Technology and the G7 Economies", World 
Economics, vol. 4, no. 4, October-December, 139-170. 
LI H., & XU Y. (2002): "Survival Bias and the Equity Premium Puzzle", Journal of 
Finance, 57, 1981-1993. 
London Economics and PricewaterhouseCoopers (2006): "An Assessment of the 
Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications: Growth and Investment in the 
EU e-Communications Sector",  Report for DG-InfSo. 
RÖLLER L.-H. & WAVERMAN L. (2001): "Telecommunications Infrastructure and 
Economic Development: A Simultaneous Approach", American Economic Review, 
vol. 4, 909-923. 
WALLESTEN S.J.: 
- (2003a): "Privatizing Monopolies in Developing Countries: The Real Effects of 
Exclusivity Periods in Telecommunications", AEI-Brookings Joint Center for 
Regulatory Studies, Related Publication 03-17. Aug. 
- (2003b): Of Carts and Horses: Regulation and Privatization in Telecommunications 
Reforms, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Related Publication 
4. Dec. 
WHITE H. (1980): A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and 
a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity, Econometrica 48: 817-830. 
 
 
